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Abstract
Stochastic Disturbances, Nontraded Goods and the Exchange Regime
Past research has argued that, in the presence of disturbances, the choice
of an exchange regime depend,s upon: i) the source of disturbances and ii) the
openness of the economy. In this paper we demonstrate that, when all goods are
tradeable, the source of disturbances is unimportant, whereas attitudes towards
risk are of fundamental importance in choosing regimes. Further, we show that,
when nontraded goods are present, the degree of commodity substitutability is
crucial. Somewhat surprisingly, we also demonstrate that the more closed an
economy is, the more likely it is that fixed rates are preferrable.
STOCHASTIC DISTURBANCES, NONTRADED GOODS AND
THE CHOICE OF THE EXCHANGE REGIME
Much of the discussion concerning the relative desirability of fixed versus
flexible exchange rates has focused upon the ability of each regime to stabilize
an economy in the presence of internal and external disturbances. The consensus
opinion - as reflected in Fischer (1977), Laffer (1973), and Mundell (1973) - is
that fixed exchange rates are preferable if disturbances are real and internal.
The "rest of the world", via domestic Trade Account surpluses or deficits, acts
to absorb some of these shocks. Flexible rates, however, are viewed as preferable
for those disturbances that emanate from abroad or for internal nominal distur
bances. Indeed, if there is only one traded good and no capital mobility, a
flexible rate system will perfectly insulate the economy from foreign distur
bances .
A second basis for comparing exchange regimes has been the openness of the
domestic economy. Papers following the lead of McKinnon (1963) have argued
that fixed rates are preferable for relatively open economies while flexible
rates are preferable for relatively closed economies. Shocks to the exchange
rate (presumably from external disturbances) will have small effects on the
domestic price level if the size of the traded goods sector is small. Highly
open economies, on the other hand, should peg the exchange rate in order to
maintain the purchasing power of the domestic currency.
While intuitively it seems that both the source of the disturbances and
the degree of openness of the economy would be important components in choosing
between exchange regimes, it should be noted that few papers have presented a
micro-theoretic approach in addressing these issues. Helpman and Razin (1979),
and Lapan and Enders (1980) have argued that the choice between exchange regimes
ultimately hinges on which regime provides higher expected utility for individuals
Thus, it would seem as though tastes of individual agents would be the appro
priate yardstick fror making comparisons between regimes. Further, consistency
requires that the demand or expenditure functions used to describe macroeconomic
behavior should be generated from these agents' utility functions. In Lapan
and Enders (1980) we utilized a consumption-loan model to derive agents' behavior
under uncertainty, and then to compare expected utility under the alternative
exchange regimes. The basic conclusion of the paper is that the primary deter
minant of the choice of the exchange regime is not the source of disturbance,
but rather individual attitudes towards risk (the elasticity of the marginal
utility of income). However, our previous paper assumed that there was only
one good, which was traded. Hence, a flexible exchange regime completely insu
lated the economy from external disturbances. As there were no nontraded goods
in the model, no conclusions concerning the relevance of the openness of the
economy were feasible. It is the purpose of this paper to remedy those omissions
and to investigate how relative price movements in traded goods or the presence
of nontraded goods affects our earlier conclusions.
In Section I we present the basic model and derive the behavior of indivi
duals under uncertainty. Section II, using the analysis of Section I, compares
the expected utility of fixed rates to that of flexible rates in the case in
which all goods are traded. It is shown that regardless of the number of
traded goods and regardless of the source of disturbances, the choice between
exchange regimes only depends upon individual attitudes towards risk. Sections
III and IV introduce nontraded goods into the analysis. In the presence of
nontraded goods, the size of the nontraded goods sector, the source of distur
bances, and the parameters of the utility function (specifically the degree of
risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-
tradables) are important criteria in choosing between fixed and flexible rates.
Much of the work on Optimum Currency Areas (see Tower and Willett (1976) for a
review) emphasizes the importance of the productive structure of an economy in
the fixed-flexible rate choice. Our results concerning the degree of risk aver
sion and the elasticity of substitution are complementary to the Optimum
Currency literature by focusing on the structure of the demand side of the
economy. In the last section of the paper, we present Our conclusions and
directions for further research.
I) The Model of Individual Behavior
We employ Samuelson's (1958) consumption-loan framework in which there are
two overlapping generations, each containing N individuals. Individuals born
at time period t work - and derive income - in t, and consume in (t) and (t+1).
Money is assumed to be the only store of value (commodities are perishable), so
individuals born at t will sell part of their production for money, using the
money to finance consumption at (t+1). Let:
1) - be consumption of good i in t of an individual of generation t;
2) ~ consumption of good i in (t+1) of an individual of generation t.
3) - be the domestic currency price of good i at time j.
Individuals of all generations have identical utility funcitons which are given
by:
4) 0^ =U(CS
where C^, are vectors, V( ) is assumed homogeneous of degree one in its
arguments, and hence (1-0) is the degree of relative risk aversion. For sim
plicity, we adopt the CES form:
5) V(x') =
I
I 6 (xb~^
i«l ^
-1/p
, P 0
where X has been used to represent C or B, - 1, all share parameters (6)
are positive, and I is the number of goods in the economy. Further,
6) a is the (partial) elasticity of substitution between coinmodities.
Given nominal income at t(Y^) and prices (P^), the agent must decide on
current consumption (C^) and savings. Let denote nominal spending at t;
t t
then, maximizing (5) subject to the budget constraint (S^ - ^ 0) yields
current demands:
S
7) = • = P^/P^' ^i r 1
Substituting (7) into (5) yields;
•'••ti.i© -i'-n
For p=0 (<3=1) the limiting values of 5, 7 and 8 are
5') v(x'^ ) = = 1-
7')
8") V(X ) ='
1=1
Further, spending at t(t+l) is governed by:
9) +
From (4), it is clear that the optimal decision is:
10) = (Y^/2); hence:
11) 't+1
.d .
where is money demand at t
Thus, for an agent born at t:
(Y /2)®(H(r ))®''^ H(r
° „,„t.0/2 ,„t+l>0/2 •0(Pp •(Pi -)
13) H(rj)
(1/0-1)
. a st 1
j = t, (t + 1)
Turning to the production side, output of each good is assumed linear in
labor input and subject to a random multiplicative disturbance. The disturbances
are assumed to differ across sectors, but the disturbances within any sector
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are identical for all men±)ers of the working generation. Since preferences
and production functions are identical, all members of generation j will allo
cate the same amount of labor to good i. Letting represent output of good i
in period j, the aggregate labor allocation by the generation born at j to
good i, the amount of labor an individual born in j allocates to good i, and
the disturbance to good i in period j:
Wi) E(x^) 2 =n-l^
Before considering the choice of exchange regimes, consider a completely
closed economy. Given a constant money stock (M) money market equilibrium
requires:
. <f) •15) = (NY^/2) =' M, or Y where
.t^tYt = (SP^Qp/N is the income of an individual at t, and Nis the number of
individuals (all of whom are identical). From equation 7), aggregate demand
(NC^ + NB^) for good i at t is:"
16) c: =
, ST"'--" 'N'Y A
17)
T)
18)
k=lVl
Hence, from commodity market equilibrium:
t\a
1 1
k k
19) =
X^ptTt
or
1/a
, determines relative prices.
^l^l^lk=iVP^
0-1'
Since NY;^ = 2M, once relative prices are known, equation 19) determines the-
price level. Having solved the system for prices and commodity demands, it is
possible to obtain the utility for a member of generation t.
In Section II we consider the differences between fixed and flexible rates
for an economy in which all goods are traded; in Section III we introduce non-
traded goods. Opening the economy to international trade alters the analysis
in that the prices of traded goods are determined on international markets, and
the money supply need not be constant if the exchange rate is fixed. The
differing mechanisms by which prices are determined under alternative exchange
regimes will influence realized utility, expected utility, and the labor supply
decision.
II) Traded Goods and the Choice of Exchange Regimes
Consider the case in which only traded goods exist. We assume that distur
bances to real output occur domestically and in the rest of the world; these
disturbances are assumed to be generated by a stationary process that is
serially uncorrelated.
20) E[(xJ. - =0
22) \ =Pj T. x'r'l'
V j 5^ t.
The country under study is assumed small, so that its net demands (or
supplies) have no effect on foreign currency prices of commodities. Hence,
under- either regime, the relative prices of commodities are independent of
events in this small country, i.e. the r^ are determined in the rest of the
world. Further, for a fixed exchange rate regime, the domestic currency prices
are also independent of events within this country. Using the demand functions
obtained in Section I, for an individual born at t, the distribution of utility
under a fixed exchange rate regime is given by (12):
(Y /2)®(H(r ))®^^H(r
Note that and r^ are random variables; assuming their distributions are
XI •
stationary and serially uncorrelated, and that the labor allocations are also
stationary:
0/2
23) E[U^] = - E
J
8The second equality In (23) follows from the symmetry and stationarity of the
random variables.
Under flexible exchange rates, relative conmiodity prices are exogenous to
the small country, but the price level is endogenous. Assuming no capital
mobility - so that there is Balance of Trade equilibrium in each period - we
have from (15):
t.
24) NY. = NPMa.r.L.l = 2M ;
t X ^ i 1 1
t,t - 2Mor: P, =
^ N[j:xJr^L.]^i i 1 1
Substituting in (12) we have - under flexible exchange rates:
25)
0/2 / t+1 f+1
0
where is the distribution of utility for a member of generation (t) under
flexible exchange rates. It is important to note that flexible exchange rates
do not isolate a country from foreign disturbances that affect relative prices,
it only isolates the country from movements in the foreign price level, such as
those generated by a pure inflation abroad.
Assume the labor allocation is the same regardless of which regime is
chosen. Define:
26) y^ =
Then, from (23) and (25), the difference in expected utility between the two
exchange regimes is given by:
(27) E[ll^ - U^]
20
20
0/2 3/2
- 2.y ^t+l ^ ^t+l
0/A\
0/2/
yt+1^
•i/ J
(H(r^)H(r^_^^))0/2
Clearly, the term over which the expectation runs is always non-negative, and
the expectation is positive. Hence:
(28) E[U^ - U^] ^ 0 as 07 0.
Further, note that (1-0) is the degree of relative risk aversion. Thus, regard
less of the number of traded goods and regardless of the source of the distur
bances, the choice between the exchange regimes hinges solely on individual
attitudes towards risk. The greater the degree of risk aversion, the greater
the desirability of flexible relative to fixed exchange rates.
(A) Endogenous Labor Choice
Thus far, we have assumed that the distribution of real output —i.e., the
labor choice - would be the same regardless of the exchange regime. However,
one common contention in the literature is that the allocation of resources
under fixed exchange rates will tend to be more efficient - that is, the economy
will - under fixed exchange rates - be more likely to produce according to its
comparative advantage. It is well-known (see, for example, Turnovsky (1974))
that even with output linear in labor, under uncertainty an economy will not -
in general - specialize in the good in which it has a comparative advantage. A
plausible issue, then, is under which regime will more resources be allocated
to the nation's export sector.
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Thus, consider a two-good world; each individual chooses his(her) labor
allocation before prices and productivity are known. As earlier, consumption
decisions in t are made after income and prices are realized. The indirect
utility function is given by (21), and income by (22); the individual must
choose before (xj, rj, P^) are known. Given two goods, he chooses to:
0
29) = Max E
(L^) \
11 2 2 2
subject to: ^ 1»
Optimizing over yields
t 11 111
30) = E
3l:
(1/0)
.0-1
0/2
1
For fixed exchange rates, r^ are exogenous, and hence (30) determines the
optimal labor choice (L^). Note that this decision rule is stationary if the
random variables have identical, independent distributions over time.
For flexible exchange rates, depend upon domestic - as well as
foreign - realizations. Substituting (24) into (30) yields the optimal labor
. A
decision rule under flexible exchange rates (L^^) •
9U
31) = E
3l:
- 1
^ al- X^r^)
/
\
,t+l,t+l , t+1 t+1 t+1
1 1 2 2 2
Again, it is apparent that the optimal allocation (L^^) is stationary under our
assumptions.
Acomparison of the solution to (30) (L^) to that for (31) (L^^) would
indicate under which regime more specialization takes place in accordance with
comparative advantage. Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide an analytic
.0/A
j
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solution to either equation, nor is it possible to provide a qualitative compari
son of the solutions. However, some rather general observations are possible.
Note that - due to the assumed stationarity of the distributions - the
terms involving (t+1) in (30) and (31) do not affect labor choices at (t).
Hence, for fixed exchange rates the optimal labor choice (L^) is determined by
(30*), whereas for flexible exchange rates is determined by (31'):
30M E[((P^)®^^(X^L* + ~^2^2^ °
31*) E[(X^L^ + ^ ~^2^2^ °
3
Suppose, for simplicity, that no foreign disturbances are present':
pj = =1. Then, a comparison of (30*) and (31') indicates that the difference
in labor allocations under the two regimes will reflect differences in attitudes
towards risk. To be clear, the agents are assumed to have the same preferences
(utility functions) - and hence the same degree of risk aversion - under either
regime. However, in making their ex ante labor choice, agents under fixed
exchange rates behave as though their degree of relative risk aversion is (1-0),
whereas agents under flexible exchange rates behave as though their degree of
relative risk aversion is (1 - 0/2).'^ Thus, for 0 > 0, agents operating-under
a flexible exchange regime behave as though they are more risk averse than those
under a fixed exchange regime, whereas for 0 < 0 the opposite is true.
While no direct inferences can be made concerning the degree of speciali
zation due to these differences in risk aversion, it seems plausible that less •
risk averse agents will tend to specialize more in accord with comparative
advantage. Thus, ceteris paribus, we expect that - for 0 > 0. - more resources
will be allocated to the good in which the country has-a comparative advantage
under fixed rates, whereas for 0 < 0 more specialization in accord with compara
tive advantage is likely under flexible exchange rates.^
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For example, suppose the distributions of are such that it is
just optimal to specialize in the production of good 1 under fixed exchange
rates; i.e., suppose that, at L* = 1, L* = 0:
32) - ^2)] = 0.
Given - ^2 " implies specialization in good 1 is nust optimal under
ys
fixed exchange rates. Using (32) in (31*) it is readily seen that, at - 1,
4 = 0:
33) - X^)] =E[X^®^^.{X® ^(X^ - X^)}] 7 0as 0^ 0.
In other words, (32) and (33) imply that, for 0 > 0,. specialization is more
likely under fixed exchange rates, while for 0 < 0, it is more likely under
6
flexible exchange rates.
Similarly, it is clear that if there is only one productivity disturbance
(i.e., ^2 - ^^^1^ ^ ' then the less risk-averse individual will allocate
more labor to sector 1.^ Thus, for 0 > 0, production under fixed exchange rates
will be more specialized to the good in which the country has a comparative
advantage, while for 0 < 0 flexible exchange rates will provide greater speciali
zation according to comparative advantage.
When disturbances occur in both sectors it does not seem possible to
conclude which regime yields greater specialization according to comparative
advantage, as the resulting allocation will depend on both distributions.
Nevertheless, from the foregoing it is clear that it is not generally true that
less specialization occurs under flexible exchange rates. Rather, it seems that
the degree of relative risk aversion is crucial in determining which regime
yields more specialization, as well as in determining which regime offers higher
g
expected utility.
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This completes our treatment of the pure traded goods case. We have seen
that - contrary to conventional wisdom - the source of disturbances is not
important in determining which regime is optimal; rather, attitudes towards
risk emerge as the crucial factor. Similarly, we have seen that there exists
no prior presumption as to which regime will yield greater specialization in
accord with comparative advantage; this, too, seems in conflict with the suppo
sition that the exchange risk under flexible rates will reduce specialization
and induce a country to be more self-sufficient. As for expected utility,
individual attitudes towards risk emerge as the crucial factor in determining
which regime yields greater specialization.
We now turn to investigate how the introduction of nontraded goods alters
these results. In particular, we wish to determine if the size of the nontraded
good sector is important in choosing between the two exchange regimes, as well
as ascertaining how the results of this section need to be modified due to the
presence of nontraded goods.
III. Nontraded Goods and the Exchange Regime
Before considering the role of nontraded goods, it will be instructive to
explain the results we have obtained for traded goods. . Fischer (1977), Laffer
(1973), and Mundell (1973) relate the choice of exchange regime to the source and
type of disturbance. For example, if disturbances are real and internal, it is
argued that fixed exchange rates - via trade deficits and surpluses - act to
smooth out the consumption stream. In periods in which output has randomly
increased (decreased)., individuals can save (dissave) by generating a trade
surplus (deficit). With fixed rates, then, individuals can save in periods of^
high prosperity in order to consume in periods of low prosperity. With flexible
rates, such saving is not possible: any change in output leads to an equivalent
change in consumption. To paraphrase this argument, fixed rates allow consumption
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levels in adjacent periods to be positively correlated, even if output distur
bances are not. Hence, the focus is on the degree of correlation of consumption
levels.
While the argument made is correct insofar as the positive correlation of
aggregate consumption under fixed exchange rates, we have seen that the norma
tive conclusions are not correct. The explanation lies not only in considering
the correlation of intertemporal consumption^ but also in considering its varia
bility. In terms of Section II, under fixed exchange rates the individual's
real consumption in each period depends primarily upon his income level in the
first.period. Thus, large (small) income in the first period will be associated
with above (below) average consumption in each period. Hence, the individual's
consumption level for each period is positively correlated (which is desirable),
but the variability of real income is large since there is no averaging between
the different periods of life. Essentially, fixed exchange rates allow inter
national risk sharing, but no intergenerational sharing (in the context of this
model).
On the other hand, under flexible exchange rates the individual's real
consumption in the first period of life depends on output in that period. Real
spending by the retired generation in t depends upon the fixed nominal money
supply and prices in t. Thus, real consumption when.retired depends not on real
income in the first period, but rather real income in the second period. Thus,
the real purchasing power of the retired generation's money balances depends
upon realized domestic output levels under flexible, but not under fixed exchange
rates. Hence, under felxible rates (with no capital mobility), consumption is
not serially correlated; but the distribution of utility (consumption) in each
period depends upon real output in that period.
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Thus, in comparing the two regimes, we find that a fixed exchange rate
regime offers positive correlation of consumption in each period, which is
desirable when there is a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between
intertemporal consumption bundles. However, utility is less variable under
flexible exchange rates, which is a benefit for risk-averse individuals. Thus,
it seems plausible that individuals who are not very risk averse (0 > 0) will
prefer fixed exchange rates, whereas those who are quite risk averse (© < 0)
will prefer flexible rates.
The same basic argument holds true for external disturbances. For simpli
city, assume relative prices are unchanging, but the foreign price level is
random. Then - for this case - flexible exchange rates provide complete insula
tion, so that (barring internal disturbances) domestic consumption levels will
be constant. Under fixed rates, however, real consumption will be affected by
movements in the foreign price level. While - at first glance - it might appear
that fixed rates will always be inferior, some thought demonstrates that this
is not so. In particular, it is well-known that price variability can increase
consutner surplus. An individual - with given nominal money balances, M, - will
consume (in a one-good world) C = (M/P), By Jensen's inequality, E[C] -
E[M/P] > (M/E[P]). Hence, the variability in foreign prices increases expected
consumption levels under fixed rates. Whether this variability increases or
decreases utility depends on the individual's degree of risk aversion (equiva-
lently, the rate at which the marginal utility of C changes); for low degrees of
risk aversion (0 > 0), the variability is an asset, whereas for very risk-averse
individuals (O < 0) the high variability of consumption (utility) outweighs the
increase in expected consumption levels. Thus, we see that - regardless of the
source of the disturbance - individual attitudes towards risk emerge as the
crucial factor.
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We now introduce nontraded goods into the analysis: in doing so, however,
it is important to consider the role of the elasticity of commodity substitution.
Earlier we have argued - ceteris paribus - that the greater the degree of correla
tion in intertemporal consumption levels, the larger expected utility will be.
By the same token, as long as the elasticity of commodity substitution is finite,
it is desirable to consume traded and nontraded goods in the same proportion
in each period. Ceteris paribus, the regime which tends to reduce the varia
bility of the ratio of traded to nontraded good consumption is likely to be
Q
more desirable. However, under flexible rates with Balance of Trade equili
brium, this ratio is determined domestically; an increase in production of the
traded good by 1% will increase the consumption ratio of traded to nontraded
goods by that 1%. Under fixed exchange rates, while the aggregate level of
consumption of the nontraded good is given, the level of consumption of traded
goods is endogenous. A 1% increase in output of the traded good may lead to a
1/2% rise in the consumption ratio of traded to nontraded goods. Thus, the
proportion in which the two goods are consumed is likely to be more stable
under fixed rates, and this ratio is likely to be positively correlated under
fixed rates, while it will tend to be serially uncorrelated and more volatile
under flexible rates.
Intuitively, then, it would appear that the presence of nontraded goods
increases the desirability of fixed exchange rates, a view that seems in con
flict with the traditional perspective.^^ Moreover, the preceding argument
indicates the importance of the elasticity of commodity substitution. If the
two goods are perfect substitutes, we are really back to our earlier analysis;
however, the smaller thie degree of substitutability between the goods, the more
important it is that fixed rates decrease the variability of the consumption
ratio.
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The introduction of nontraded goods greatly complicates the formal
analysis; for simplicity we consider a small country that produces only a
traded and a nontraded good and that the labor allocations between sectors are
exogenous.The foreign currency price of the traded good (good 1) is exo
genous, while the domestic currency price of the nontraded good (good 2) is
determined on domestic markets. Preferences are as given in Section I; hence
the indirect utility function of a person born at t is given by;
12')
13') H(r^) E6°"^
1/(0-1)
where is the domestic currency price of the tradable at time i, r^ is the
relative price of the nontradable good at time i, and 6^ is the preference
weight attached to the tradable good. Also, Y^, nominal income, is given by:
34) \ = + L^+L2 = 1;
where, as earlier, is the labor allocated by an individual to sector i, and
is the productivity terra. We assume:
35) E[X^] =1; E[(X^ - 1)(X^ - 1)] =0 unless i =j and t =k.
Under flexible exchange rates, with no capital mobility, demand for each
good must equal domestic supply. Thus, from (17) and (18):
.1/a
/1-6A/ 1. V
36)
Also, from (15) and (19):
37) = (2M/N); and
18
-1
38) Pj = 2M NL_ X
Hence, under flexible exchange rates, the current price of both goods depends
only upon current realizations. Finally, substituting back into (12 ) and (13 )
yields:
a-1
t+1
39) -
0
n \ (x^) ^ +
j=t(
1-6.
0-1
L,
0a
(Xp
>
0-1 2(a-l)
a •
In essence, under flexible exchange rates, the two generations share equally
in all risk; hence, the two-period consumption bundle of a person born at t
is given by:
xJli
40) NC° = (?)'•
1 +
•l-6.\^ .
.-1
Simplifying (AO) yields;
'NY
h
2 ' 2 / * \ 2 * 2
The situation under fixed exchange rates is quite different. First, the
domestic money supply (M^) is endogenous; and secondly, the domestic currency
price of the tradable good is exogenous. The indirect utility function of a
representative individual is still given by (12*) and (13'), and individual
Income by (3A). However, is exogenously determined, and r^ (or P^) is given
by equating aggregate demand for good 2 to aggregate supply (see equation 16):
2 t
' y
Al) 2r + r
/ +2K^/?l
1-5.
\
\
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Where, as earlier, is aggregate labor supply to sector 1, and is aggregate
domestic money supply. Further, is given by:
42) ^
Thus, the price of the nontradable at t depends not only upon the realization
of disturbances at t, but also upon the domestic money supply at t. However,
in general, depends upon the realization of disturbances at (t-1), and upon
and so forth. Consequently, depends upon the realization of all
disturbances up to, and including, t. Given the difficulty of solving for the
ex ante expected utility of individuals and the ex ante distribution of the
12
money supply, we let the distributions of the exogenous random variables be:
43) = 1 +
- 1 +
= 2/[l + bjAj]
NOTE: With a flexible rate, is endogenous.
In 43) the b^ are parameters, the are serially uncorrelated random variables,
and:
44) E[A^] = 0, E[A^-A^] =V. >0 for i = j, k = t
Further, define U*:
45) U* = E
= 0 otherwise.
13
0(pJ)®/2(pt+i)e/2
10/2(0-1)
In (45), the expectation Is taken ex ante, i.e., since r^, appear in (45),
and since (via depends on A^ ..•)» the expectation runs
20
over all for j ^ t + 1. Given the distributions of the ex ante expected
uitlity depends upon (b^, b2» ^3)5 6-» we can think of expected utility as
being a function of the b parameters: U* = U^Cb^, b^, b^). Similarly, for
^ A
flexible exchange rates, expected utility (U = depends on the distribu-
A
tions of (X^, ; given the distribution of U then depends on (b^^, b^)^
TJ = U(b^, b^). Let:
46) U* - ; U* - . 3^"*
i 3b. * ij 9b.ab.
1 1 J
/-7^ r, - 3^U47) Uj = 7^^ ; U.. =
i 3b. ij
; i,j = 1,2,3.
Then, for small b^, ex ante expected utility can be approximated by
3 .33
48) U*(bT , b_, b.) 2 U*(0, 0, 0) + E U*(0)b. +Z j:U*.(0)bb.
1=1 1«1 J=1
2 ^ - 2 2
49) UCb, , b.) s U(0, 0) + SU.(0)b, E EU.,(0)b,b.
ii ,,i iZ.,.,!"] ii
i=l i=l 3=1
14Clearly, for b^ = 0, fixed and flexible rates are identical, and:
(0a/a-l) / y0 00
-^ (^) .
0-1
teV
Vi/
50) U^(0) = U(0) =
= A
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where
For flexible exchange rates, the Taylor series expansion of ('49) is
straightforward, using (39), (43) and (44) yields:
52) U(b.
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where is the variance of
For fixed exchange rates, the analysis is considerably more complicated
because of the endogeneity of M^; the distribution of in turn, affects that
of r^. However, for small an approximate expression for V* can be derived.
From (41):
53) dr
0-1
2ar lA)\
- t
dP^
54) dxl =A^-db^;
-A^db3
(1 + b3A^)
From (42) led forward one period :
55) dM
t+1
Evaluating (53) and (55) at b^ = 0 yields:
2o(1+a,)
2M^ dP^
/ a, \ l _ ^ 2L^A^(a^+a) _ za^ 1,0-1;
56) (a^+2a) (aj^+2a) "*• (a^+2a)
hence:
2r(a.-hj) ^ , 2a (o-Dt 2<j(l+a^)L^
= (L+2a) + (a,+2a) h ^• '^^ 2 + (a^+2a) S
where:
_ t-l/. / a. N
J •1 = 1,2,3.
dX
+ r.
2a^(o-l)I,^A2db2
Thus, the variation in the money stock around its steady-state level (which is
M* =L^(l+a^)) is given by (57), and can be seen to depend upon the history of
the realizations of the A^. Substituting (57) into (53), and evaluating at
b. = 0 yields the variation in r around its steady-state level (r* = *
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as dependent upon all past and current disturbances:
/ t 2a (o-l)
J<^^259) dr^ =
2(a^+a)
^1 (a^+2a) _1 db, -
fn4. lA*" - 7"=-!^/ (l+aj^) 3 (c,^+2a) ^3 db.
Note that, for a=l, past disturbances in the nontraded goods sector do not
influence r^; otherwise, all past disturbances influence the current value of
r .
t
Finally, taking a Taylor series expansion of (45) around b^ = 0, and
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evaluating it yields:
60) U*(b^, b2, b^) =
-/ 1 + (a^+2a) +
u2„ 2
(1+a^)^
AQa/a-l))l.
0 1-
2(a^+2a)'
2(a-l) [20(0-1) - a^^d+a^)]
(a^+2a) (a^+a)
(l+a^)(2+a^) (a-1)(a^+2a-l)
ai(ai+2a) (a^+2a)(o+a^) +b2v3 (0a+a^) ^(c^+(j)(aj^+2o)^_
Finally, subtracting (52) from (60) yields the (approximate) difference in
expected utility between fixed and flexible exchange rates:
a
61) UA(b^,b2,b3) - U(b^,b2) =
(0a/o-l)^^y (90/0-1)
(1+a^)
-1)
+o)
/ 2Qa . ^V ^^2"l^^"^(a^+2a) aJ (a^+a) (a3^+2a) (a^+2a)^a^
0(2a(a-l) - a^(l+a^)) +
(o-l)a^(a^+2a)
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While the results of (61) might not seem "apparent", several confirmations
are available. Consider the terra in brackets ({}), as a it is clear the
sign of the term in brackets depends only on 0. Thus, lim[U* - U] —0 as
<J-H»
0-^0. This confirms the result of our earlier section since, even if good 2
is not "tradable", if it is a perfect substitute for good 1, it is essentially
tradable. Similarly, as cx^ 0 (the economy is completely open), the difference
in expected utilities again depends only on 0: lim[U* - U] —0 as 0 —0, thus,
the results of Section XI are replicated as 0-^^
It is apparent from (61) that both the elasticity of substitution (and the
relative size of the nontraded good sector) are important in ranking the alter
native exchange regimes. Because of the complexity of equation 61, we first
consider the case in which only real disturbances in the traded good sector
occur (b2 = ^3 ~ * Then:
> > a (a +2o) 30^62) U* - Uas 0- - 2 = 3^ ' °
2a -L
In (62), (1-0*) reflects the critical degree of risk aversion for which the two
regimes yield equal expected utility. If the degree of relative risk aversion
is less than (1-0*), fixed will be preferable, otherwise flexible is preferred.
As discussed earlier, the degree of risk aversion is important, because
real income - and hence utility - tends to be more variable under fixed exchange
rates, because the agent's real purchasing power is primarily affected by events
during his working life, whereas under flexible rates intergenerational risk
sharing occurs. For fixed exchange rates with only traded goods, the utility
of an agent born at t is unaffected by productivity disturbances at (t+1). The
introduction of nontraded goods alters the picture insofar as the price of the
nontraded good is endogenous. Thus, increases in output of the traded good at
t increase the demand for and the price of the nontraded good at t, adding to
the variability of real income under fixed exchange rates. On the other hand,
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increases in output of the traded good at (t+1) increases the price of the
nontraded good under fixed rates, thereby lowering the retired generations'
real income - this, too, increases the variability of utility under fixed rates.
Nevertheless, as can be seen from (62), the introduction of nontraded goods
tends to favor fixed exchange rates when disturbances are confined to the traded
goods sector. In particular, from (62) it is clear that the fixed exchange
rate regime is more likely to be preferred (for given 0) when i) o is small, or
ii) is large.Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, the larger is the
nontraded sector, the more likely it is that fixed rates are pr.eferable.^.
The explanation for this phenomenon lies in considering the relative varia
bility of the ratio of consumption of the nontraded to that of the traded good
(C^/C^) - or, equivalently, the variability and serial correlation of relative
prices. Under flexible exchange rates, the variability of this ratio is deter
mined exclusively by current realizations, and hence it is serially uncorrelated.
However, under fixed exchange rates relative prices will tend to be less variable
and will be positively correlated. How important this is ultimately depends on
the degree of substitutability (a) and the relative size of the nontraded goods
sector (oj^). For low a, fixed rates are almost always preferred; the smaller
is a (the larger is a^)j the more likely it is fixed rates are preferable.
Similar conclusions hold when only foreign price disturbances occur. For
flexible rates, the economy is completely insulated, whereas for fixed rates
the domestic economy is affected by movements in the foreign price level. As
we have seen for the case of only traded goods, whether these foreign price
movements help or hurt depends upon the degree of risk aversion - in particular,
it depends upon whether the utility function is convex or concave in prices.
For only traded goods, 0 > 0 implies fixed rates are preferable.
I
When nontraded goods are present, the same basic logic holds, though the
results are more complicated. Even if the foreign price movements are serially
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uncorrelated, the relative price of the nontraded good will be serially (nega
tively) correlated. As can be seen from (61), fixed rates will be preferred to
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flexible rates when only foreign price disturbances are present if:
63) }}* y i as Q~ Q= |^ >0, |^ < 0.< < 1 3o da^
As for the case of disturbances to the traded good sector, it is clear that the
presence of nontraded goods increases the range (of risk aversion) over which
fixed rates are preferrable. Thus, as q ^ 0, fixed rates will always be pre
ferred because of the ability to adjust the components of the consumption bundle
at t. Also, as noted earlier, fixed rates are more likely to be preferred when
i) o is low, or ii) is large. Again we see that - contrary to prior results -
a large nontraded goods sector tends to favor fixed exchange rates. These
results are summarized in Figures I and II.
When disturbances occur (only) in the nontraded goods sector, it is clear
that the comparison of exchange regimes is far more complicated, and the role
of the elasticity of substitution (a) is far more crucial. We have seen, for
example, that when disturbances occur in the traded good sector, then under
fixed rates an individual's real income (utility) in each period is positively
correlated, as are movements in the relative price of the nontraded good (under
flexible rates all variables are serially uncorrelated if the disturbances are
uncorrelated). The presence of the nontraded good sector changes the precise
criteria for determining which regime is better, but it does not change the
fundamental characteristics of the two regimes. In some sense, the presence of
the nontraded good is of secondary importance in this case; changes in the
relative price of the nontraded good will affect the magnitude, but not the
direction of changes in nominal income Induced by the disturbances in the
traded goods sector.
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FIGURE I
The Choice of Exchange Regimes: Real
Disturbances in Traded Good Sector
FIXED
FIXED
FLEXIBLE
-a^(a^+2o)
0* = 2 > 0 ^ fixed rates are preferred
la
•k
effects of an increase in a, on 0
FIXED
FIXED
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FIGURE II
The Choice of Exchange Regimes
Foreign Price Disturbances
FLEXIBLE
0 - -(a^/a); for 0 > 6 , fixed rates are preferred
—: effects of an increase in on 0.
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For disturbances in the nontraded goods sector, the autocorrelation of
relative prices and real income under fixed rates depends crucially upon a; now
the movements in the relative price of the nontraded good are of primary impor
tance in contrasting the two regimes. Consider, for example, an increase in
output in the nontraded good at time t. Under flexible rates, nominal income
will be unaltered by this change; the (nominal and relative) price of the non-
traded good will fall, real income for both generations alive at t will rise
(they share equally the "extra" output), but prices or real income at (t+1)
will be unaltered by this (transitory) disturbance. How the nominal price of
the tradable good will change depends upon a; for a < 1, it will rise, while
for a > 1 it falls.
The effect of the same increase in output under fixed rates is a bit more
complicated. Clearly, the (nominal and relative) price of the nontraded good
will fall; as for flexible rates, how much it falls depends on a; real income
for both generations alive at t will increase, but which group benefits more
also depends on a. For a < 1, the increase in output of the nontraded good at
\
t causes nominal income to fall at t; hence, the retired generation'benefits
more than the working generation from this increase in output. Further, since
nominal income falls, the real income at (t+1) of the generation born at t will
decrease, and the price of the nontraded good at (t+1) will (tend to) be reduced
by the increase in output at t. Hence, for a < 1, the price of the nontraded
good is positively serially correlated, while the real income of the individual
in each period is negatively correlated. For a > 1, the results are opposite;
the increase in output of the nontraded good at t causes its price to fall, but
nominal income at t (money balances at (t + 1)) to rise. Both generations
alive at t benefit, but the working generation benefits more. Further, real
income (utility) for the generation born at t increases in both periods, while
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the price of the nontraded good at (t+1) tends to increase due to the increase
in output at t. Hence, for a > 1, individual utility in each period is posi
tively correlated, while relative price movements are negatively correlated.
Finally, for o = 1, the increase in output of the nontraded good at t
leaves nominal income unaltered under fixed rates, while the price of the
traded good is unaltered under flexible rates. Under fixed rates, since nominal
income is unaltered, real income in each period and price movements are uncor-
felated. Consequently, for o = 1, the two regimes yield identical results -
and hence equal expected utility - when disturbances occur only the nontraded
sector. Clearly, then, the elasticity of substitution between commodities is
crucial in comparing the two regimes.
The actual comparison of the two regimes - when disturbances occur only in
Che nontraded sector - can be obtained from (61) by setting ~ ^3 ~
can be seen, and has been argued above, a = 1 represents a singular point for
which the two regimes are identical. For o 5^ 1, the comparison Is somewhat
complex. Before looking at this comparison, it is worthwhile to consider the
actual consumption bundle (at t, t+1) of an individual born at t. Under
flexible rates, we have argued that the generations share risk equally - hence,
f ^2''2 ^an agent's bundle is given byl — I , For fixed rates, the
actual consumption bundle is more complicated and will depend on - and
hence on past disturbances. Following the analysis pursued earlier, we can
approximate this bundle around equilibrium by considering small disturbances.
Let:
64) X] =1 +
^1+1 =^ ^2
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The consumption at i (i=t, t+1) of an individual born at t of good j (j=l,
traded; j=2, nontraded) is given by (7). Thus, let represent consumption at
i of the traded good, represent consumption at i of the nontraded good.
From (7), for an individual born at t, with = 2:
66) a e [(1-6^)/6^]
Finally, the market clearing equation (r^) is given by (41):
/l, + M
67) [2r°a ° + rJ =( '
V ^2^2
Expanding around b2 = 0 yields the agent's consumption bundle in terms of past
and current disturbances; those results are summarized in Table I for both
regimes.
The pattern that emerges there verifies our earlier discussion. Under
fixed rates, for a <1, (C^/C^) and (Cj"'"^/C2"'"^) •are positively correlated (via A^),
whereas (C^, is negatively correlated (via A^) . Similarly;, we see
T
2 2 ^
> for a < 1 - i.e., the retired generation shares more than pro-
3(b2A2"^^)
portionately the risk in the output of the nontraded good. For a > 1, the
opposite pattern emerges: an increase in A^ increases C^, but
decreases C^. Hence, (C^/C^), (C '^^ '^ /C '^^ ^) are negativley correlated, but real
L2
consumption (in t, t+1) is positively correlated. Also, .. < -y- , the
9
retired generation shares in the risk at (t+1), but less than the working gen
eration. Finally, the term ^ reflects the impact of past disturbances - via
the money stock - on current consumption.
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To consider the utility implications of this consumption pattern, rewrite
the indirect utility function (45) as:
(0cr/a-l)
68) =
0 0
2(0-1)
; wt+i
2(a-l)
We can think of as real income in period i. Since (69) holds under each
regime, differentiate with respect to
.0/2
/
70) dW^ = 0^ 2p, l-a\'1 + °
gr^dX2 + dr
2(l+gX2r^) 2(r^+a-"r^)
Evaluated at = 0 yields:
71) dW,
LA0/2
(^) (1+a^) 0o/2(a-l)
aidX^ "
2(l+a^)
b2=0
Thus, under either regime, the first period utility of an individual born at t
has the same responsiveness to current disturbances.
However, for a < 1, we have noted that - under fixed rates - the individual
born at t shares more than proportionately in the risk at (t+1); consequently,
- and hence utility - will be more variable under fixed rates than under
20flexible rates. Also, W^, tend to be negatively correlated under fixed
t 21rates (via A2) - another plus for flexible rates. However, under fixed rates
the proportion in which goods are consumed is positivley correlated.
Hence, for low o, we expect fixed rates to dominate. In general, for a < 1,
very risk-averse individuals will prefer flexible rates, while less risk-averse
individuals prefer fixed. As a increases towards one, the importance of the
ability to vary the consumption bundle ratio diminishes (C^/C^)* the-range
for which flexible rates is preferred increases.
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This pattern can be verified from (61). For ~ ^3 ~ have:
72) U* ^ Uas (a-1)
a, (a^+2<j)
0(2o(a-l) - Qt,(l+a,))+ (a-1)
1^ n" ' ' a
where U*(U) refers to expected utility under fixed (flexible) rates. For o < 1:
. ^ -(l-a)a (a +2o)
73) U* - U as 0 - —X—xx = 0' < 0.< < (2a(l-a) + a^(l+aj^))G
As o -»• 0, 0' ^ -®; as a 1, G' 0. Thus, for a < 1, very risk-averse indivi
duals prefer flexible rates, whereas others prefer fixed. As o increases, the
range of 0 over which flexible rates are preferred increases, as noted above,
(This is summarized in Figure 3.)
For 0 > 1, the pattern is more complicated. As previously noted, for o=l,
the two regimes are identical. For a close to, but greater than, one, our prior
discussion indicates utility will be more variable under flexible rates. This
is because - as seen in (71) - first period real income under either regime is
equally responsive to whereas the utility of the retired generation is more
affected by current disturbances under flexible rates. Also, utilities in (t,
(t+1)) are positively correlated under fixed rates - another advantage for a
fixed exchange rate. However, the consumption bundle ratio ((C^/C^), (C '^^ ^/cJ'^ ^))
is negatively correlated under fixed rates. Thus, for a > 1 (but close to one),
the merits of each regime are - in some sense - reversed, and we expect more
risk-averse individuals to prefer fixed rates, while less risk averse ones will
prefer flexible rates.
Again, this pattern can be verified from (61). Define a such that:
T 0 .
^2 - . 1 + a, (1+a )74) 2a - 2a - a^d+ti^) = 0; a = — — > 1 ;
Then:
> . < . a (o-l)(a + 2a)
75) a > o > 1: U* - U as: 0 - 0 = -7—^ > 0
< > a(ai(l+a,) + 2a(l-a))
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FIGURE 3
Expected Utility and Disturbances in the Nontraded Good Sector
2a - 2a = a^^Cl+a^); o > 1.
CJ = 1, fixed and flexible are identical
\
Shaded area represents region for which fixed is preferred •
35
As described earlier, it is now the case that risk aversion "favors" the choice
of fixed exchange rates. Further, as a increases, 0 increases, i.e., the
22
range of values over which flexible rates is preferred diminishes. This is
shown in Figure III.
As a increases, several things happen. The larger is o, the less important
it is that the ratio of consumption of traded to nontraded. is negatively
correlated - hence, fixed becomes more preferrable. Also, as o" increases, the
positive correlation (under fixed rates) of (W^, ^t+1^ increases - another
advantage to fixed. However, as a increases, the variation in utility due to
money supply disturbances (from past output disturbances) increases; hence, for
large a utility tends to become more variable under fixed rates once again -
another reversal of the role of risk aversion under the two regimes. From (61),
A
for a > a:
> >_ cc^ (o-l)(a^+2a)
76) U* — U as 0 — 0 = . .— TT——^ < 0, 0 > a > 1.< < o-(2a(a-l) - a^(l+aj^))
The complete picture is shown in Figure III. We note that as a -> «, 0 0,
consistent with the results when all goods are tradable.
Thus, the picture that emerges when disturbances occur in the nontraded
sector is more complicated than when disturbances occur in the tradable sector.
However, for this case - as for the others - the analysis indicates that the
value of the elasticity of substitution is fundamental in any comparison of
the two regimes. Of course, if several disturbances are simultaneously present,
(61) can be used to obtain a comparison of the two regimes. It is clear that
the magnitude, as well as the source, of the disturbances will be important in
comparing the two regimes.
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IV) Conclusions
In this paper we have used a consumption loan model in order to compare
fixed and flexible exchange rates in the presence of stochastic disturbances.
Within this context, we have focussed on two separate issues: i) when only
tradables are present, and flexible rates do not perfectly isolate an economy,
which regime should be chosen?; and ii) how does the introduction of nontradables
alter the picture?
Our results, by and large, have differed from past results in this area.
Assuming all goods are tradable, we found:
i) the source of disturbances is not important;
ii) the choice between exchange' regimes hinges upon the degree of risk
aversion of agents - less risk averse ones prefer fixed rates, more risk averse
ones flexible.
iii) there is no presumption as to which regime offers more specialization
in accord with comparative advantage. However, it seems likely that when agents
are not very risk averse, fixed rates yield more specialization, whereas the
opposite holds when agents are more risk averse.
We have also seen that the introduction of nontraded goods comiplicates the
analysis because of the autocorrelation of price movements. In the analysis
with nontraded goods we have found that:
i) the distinction between external and internal disturbances is not of
fundamental importance; rather, the more important issue seems to be whether
disturbances occur in the tradable or nontradable sector . This distinction
seems more plausible since we have already shown - for tradables - that the
source of disturbances is unimportant.
ii) when disturbances occur in the tradable sector, more risk averse indi
viduals will favor flexible rates, less risk averse ones will prefer fix^d.
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iii) moreover, we have shovm that - contrary to received doctrine - the
presence of nontraded goods increases the range of preferences over which fixed
rates are preferred. In general, the larger is the nontraded good sector, the
more likely it is fixed rates will be preferred when disturbances occur in the
tradable good sector.
iv) furthermore, our analysis indicates that the relationship between com
modities - rather than the openness of the economy - is of fundamental impor
tance. The smaller is the degree of substitutability between tradables and
nontradables, the more likely it is fixed rates will be preferred.
v) when disturbances occur in the nontradable sector, the picture is more
complicated. Nevertheless, this analysis reinforces the importance of the role
of substitutability among commodities.
The scope for further research seems enormous. In particular, it seems
desirable in discussing optimum currency areas to shift the discussion away from
considerations of "openness" of economies towards a more micro-theoretic per
spective. Our analysis demonstrates one side to this story - the interrelation
ship in consumption among commodities. A dual - and equally important issue —
concerns the production relationship between commodities. It is hoped that
this paper will spur further research in that direction as well. As economists,
it is clear that the absolute distinction between tradables and nontradables is
a false one. Rather, the extent to which that distinction is germane depends
upon the degree of substitutability in production and consumption between these
groups of goods.
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FOOTNOTES
^We assume, as noted earlier, that currencies are the only store of value.
Under fixed exchange rates, the relative prices of currencies are fixed, so no
capital gains or losses may occur. For flexible exchange rates, if agents
could hold foreign currencies, then nominal spending at (t+1) could differ from
savings at t due to capital gains or losses on foreign currency holdings. .
However, if foreign currency holdings are permitted, exchange rate determination
depends upon demands for currencies - and hence upon expectations of future
prices. From the Kareken-Wallace result it is wellrknown that with rational
expectations - a constant, but indeterminate, exchange rate is consistent with
flexible exchange rates. To avoid the resulting identity of fixed and flexible
exchange fates, we assume agents cannot hold foreign currencies; in essence, we
assume capital controls exist in the flexible exchange rate world.
2
These output disturbances are assumed serially uncorrelated and independent
across sectors; hence^E[(\^ - - ^)] =0, i 7^ k, and E[(X^ -
1 i ic ic ill
s s(^i - X^)] = 0, j 7^ s. However, within a particular sector (i) at time (j)
all disturbances are assumed identical; otherwise, aggregate variability of
good i at time j could be reduced (and perhaps eliminated) by making each
"firm" infinitessimally small.
3
It is clear that - for serially uncorrelated disturbances - only variability
in foreign relative prices matters for either exchange regime. Thus, if - due
to variable foreign monetary policy - is a random variable but, because of
unitary income elasticities of demand abroad, r^ is a constant, then
can be brought out of the expectation operator in (30') (for determination of
^ \L^). Thus, movements in the foreign price level do not affect the labor choice.
4
Each agent's degree of relative risk aversion is (1-0); however, since -
in fact - the real purchasing power of agents in (t+1) (under flexible exchange
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rates) depends on events at (t+1), and not those at t, the effect is to make
those agents behave as though their degree of relative risk aversion is (1 - 0/2).
^Of course, due to uncertainty, no simple definitions of comparative
advantage are possible. Given = r^ = 1, by a comparative advantage in good
1, we mean E[X^1 > Naturally, the whole distribution of is important
in determining the optimal allocation.
^Clearly, for 6=0, the labor allocations - and expected utility - will
be the same under the two exchange regimes. However, the probability distribu
tion of utility will differ under the two regimes. For details see Lapan and
Enders [1980].
^If 1 = A- ^ E(A^), and X. is a random variable, then no labor will be
^ Am X
allocated to sector 1.
®It should be clear that, when the labor decision in endogenous, expected
utility will be higher under fixed (flexible) rates if 0 > 0 (<0). This
follows directly from our earlier results since, if the two regimes have the
same labor allocation, 0 is the crucial factor. Thus, suppose 0 > 0; if
denotes the optimal allocation under flexible rates, then expected utility will
be higher under fixed (G > 0) if is the labor allocation under each regime.
Further, since is not optimal for fixed, it follows a fortiori that when the
labor decision is endogenous, expected utility for fixed will be higher for
0 > 0. A symmetric argument implies flexible will be preferred for 0 < 0.
^Note the crucial role played by assuming the good is nontraded. For
traded goods - under either regime - the proportion in which the goods are
consumed depends upon relative prices as determined on world markets. However,
the aggregate consumption of nontraded goods is determined domestically; thus,
the traded-nontraded consiimption ratio can be stabilized only by changing con
sumption levels of the traded good.
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'^^ However, this does not imply the more closed the economy is, the more
likely it is that fixed exchange rates are preferrable.
shown in Section II, the presence of more than one traded good does
not alter our qualitative results, even though flexible exchange rates no longer
completely insulate the economy from external disturbances. Thus, for simplicity,
we assume there is only one traded good; this should not alter our basic con
clusions.
^^Note that, unless a = 1, it is not possible to find an analytic solution
for r^. Also, if cr = 1, and only disturbances in the nontradable sector are
present, then is constant. Hence, the case of a = 1 is a special one, and
for 0=1, and only disturbances in the nontradable sector, fixed and flexible
rates are identical.
^.^The indirect utility function given in (45) holds for both regimes; its
form indicates the difficulty in finding the ex ante optimal labor allocation
under fixed rates. Under flexible rates, the system is stationary, so
will be independent of events at t; hence, the optimal ex ante (before t events
are known) allocation of labor between tradables and nontradables can be found.
However, under fixed rates, depends on as well as events at (t+1).
Thus, since the marginal utility of income at t depends on the optimal
allocation of labor (at t) between tradables and nontradables depends on the
distribution of ~ which depends on t events, and labor decisions at (t+1).
Consequently, the labor decision at (t) depends on the labor decision at (t+1),
and so forth. In general, it is not possible to solve for the optimal labor
*
allocation. However, for 0 = 0 it can be solved as the marginal utility of
income is independent of since can be determined as a function of M^,
without knowing the rule for details, see Enders and. Lapan (1980).
^^We assume that the initial value of Mis coincident with stationary
equilibrium. Notice that we are expanding around the b^. Thus, the expansion
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is not equivalent to assuming that the utility function is quadratic. Rather,
we are expanding around the parameters of the stochastic variables. Since we
expand around b. = 0, our approxiination becoroes less exact, the larger the
variations in the disturbances. Using Monte Carlo techniques, we have simulated
the model for cases in which the variations in the stochastic disturbances are
large. The qualitative results from the simulations are in accord with the
results presented in the text. We do not present the computer simulations in
order to conserve space.
^^The stationary value of r is given by (36) with = 1:
'1-6 \ / l-L^ ^ (I-LJ
r* = ; hence a, =
Consequently, is the ratio of the value of output of the nontraded good to
that of the traded good sector, and is a measure of the relative economic size
of the nontraded good sector. As increases, the economy becomes less open;
thus, is inversely related to the "openness" of the economy. Finally, note
that if resources are optimally allocated (in the stationary state), T* = 1
since the production possibility frontier is linear with slope (-1); hence, for
/1-lA /i-«iY
optimal allocations ~I ~I —/
^\he details are eliminated to conserve space; interested readers may
obtain the details from the authors. We take the Taylor Series up to quadratic
terms only.
As -*• and 0, so that ct^ = , the difference between the
two regimes tends to zero.
1
This does not imply, however, that as increases, the superiority of
fixed over flexible rates increases. We are not comparing the magnitude of the
42
differences in expected utility, but rather are discussing the lexicographic
choice of which regime is preferred.
^^Given the autocorrelation in relative prices, the condition 0a + > 0
implies, the indirect utility function is convex in prices.
can be seen from Table I, is more responsive to than to
21
Under fixed rates, an increase in will raise nominal income at t -
and real income at (t+1), but will leave real income at t unaltered for small
dW
disturbances. This can be seen from (70) with dA^ = 0; , evaluated around
equilibrium, is zero.
22Of course, (income) risk aversion implies 0 < 1.
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Appendix for Referees: Derivation of Expected
Utility under Fixed Exchange Rates
The derivation of (60) is tedious and somewhat complicated; rather than
present a full derivation, we will outline the steps by which (60) is obtained.
The indirect utility function is given by (45); since:
I.l) Yj. = ® " (1-L^)/L^;
(45) may be written as:
1.2) UA = E
0/2
(0a/a-l)/^l^ / ,,t . ,t , a„l-a^1 \-yJ ^) ^^1 +s^2^t> )
^ |E[S,t(b^, b2, .b3)]
0
2(a-l)
where, in (1.2), a e [ (1-6^), and is defined as the term in brackets.
Using (43), and assuming the expectation runs over all A^, j = (t+1, t, t-1,...),
the t^erm E[S^] may be thought of as depending only on (b^, b2» ^3)* Expanding
around b^ = 0 yields:
1.3) U*(b) =•|E[S|.(0) +dSj,(0) +id^S|.(0)],
where:
3 3S^(0) , 3 3 S^S.CO)
• db.; d^S^CO) = E Z (db.)(db )
i=l 1 1=1 j=l 1 j
1.4) . dS^(O) = Z
and S^(0), dS^(O), d S^(0) indicates the expressions are evaluated at b^ = 0.
From (1.2):
15, -OS sxK
-o o -a a
From (43):
dp!^ -A^db.
1.6) ^ I ; =A^db
(l+bjA^)
Also, dr|.(0) Is given by (59). Call the term In {} Iti (1.5) K^;
1.7) dS^ =GS^tK^l Hence:
1.8) =®Sj.dKj, +0Kj.(dS^) =6Sj.[0K^ +dK^.]
From (1.5):
/ \ / &/
2 -1 / dxj + gr^dX^ +
\
1.9) dK^ = 2
1+boA
t+1
(db3)^ -
+ gX^r
2 t
+
2g(dX2)(drj.) (dr^,)
(Xl + ^
+ (d^r^)
At b. = 0;
i
• , -o 0-1
l+oa
(r^+a r^)
+
d^r
t+1
-a a V
2(^+1+® -^t+l^
, , -o a-1
^tH-1
~ , -a a ^
I.10) r^(0) = a^/g; = a-
(a-l/o)
(0o/o-l)I.11) S(0) = 6£
(Oa/a-1) since X (0) = 1, P^CO) = 2.
1 .+1 t Ajdb^+a^A^db2+gdr^(0) 1 , l^It+l
1.12), K^(0) =Y [A3 - A^ldb^ + ^
where dr^(O) ia given by (59).
Similarly, from (1.9):
X.13) dK^(O) =i[(A^)^ - (A3'^ ^)^](db3
\2 t
2 f 2g(A2db2)dr^^ i+o^^ J (1+a^)
(dr.)^(a +a)g^ (dr )^g^-(a +o) ^ ^ s( % \
^ ^ ^ 1(1^ •2o^(l+a^) 2aj^(l+aj^) \ ^ /+
2 2
Note that, by synuneti^y, E[d - d = 0.
Using (1.3), (1.7), (1.8), (I.11) - (1.13) yields:
1.14) UA(b) = S^(0) •|-+ E(Kj.(0)) +E(0(K^(O))^ +dK|.(0))
As is clear from (1.12), E(K^(0)) = 0. Thus:
I.l5) UA(b) - S(0) E(0(K^(O))^ +dK^(0))J;
0
where E(K^(0)) and E(dK^(0)) can be evaluated from (1.12) and (1.13), using
tl s(59); all terms will involve the second .moments of (A^, A^),. where it is
t sassumed E[A^A^] = 0 unless i = j, t = s.
For example, from (59):
1.16) dr^ = 1^^1+20 J g
f.t . ,t-A
a: +^1 (a^+2a) 1 ^ dbi f (a^+2)A2 (a^+2a) ^2 j ^^2
(4 -(a^+L) ^3 ' db.
From (58):
t-l-j-
Letting:
1.18) E(A^) = V^; it can then be readily calculated:
a^+2o^
W
(a^+2a),*
2/ -,^22 aj^(a-l)
1.19) E[(drj.)^] =^ ^ V^-(db^) + ( (a^+2) + ) /•2^""2
g^(a^+2o)^
(1+a )^(ci +2a)
1.20) E[(dr^)(dr^^^)] =
g (a^+2a) ^ a y (c^+2o) 2(a^+2)
a(a+a^) / 2^ 2'
2 \ 2
(a-1) \ „ a(H-a,) «
w^(db^)^ - . . V.db:^(a+a^) 3 3
V^(dbJ t
In Che same fashion, E(A^(dr^)], (s,j—t, t+1) can readily be calculated.
Performing these calculations and substituting in (1.15) yields (60).
